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1. Introduction
This article presents a preliminary work domain theory 
(Vicente, 1999) and identifies autonomous capabilities 
needed by small unmanned aerial systems (SUASs) 
responding to a radiological disaster. As a work domain 
theory is formative, that is, it captures the key elements of 
a new tool or protocol, it contributes new questions and 
environmental constraints for the research community, 
prioritizes capabilities to be added by manufacturers, 
and helps practitioners understand the current state of 
the art of SUASs in near-Earth, low-altitude applications. 
Radiological sensing requires SUASs to fly as close to the 
source as possible because measurable radiation decreases 
with the square of the distance, thus they must operate 
at low altitudes and near structures. However, the only 
known use of SUAVs for an actual radiological event was 
the use of the Honeywell T-Hawk at the 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear accident, and the autonomous capabilities of 
the platform were not activated (Murphy, 2014). As a 
result, there is no domain theory specifying the expected 
guidance and control demands; the types of obstacles and 
terrains that are associated with a radiological disaster; 
the missions, flight paths, altitudes and proximities, and 
general strategies for localizing the source of the radiation; 
and the expected availability of GPS and wireless 
connectivity.
This paper derives the work domain theory for 
autonomy based on the 2013 Summer Institute held at the 
TexasA&MEngineering Extension Service’s Disaster City 
® complex. Disaster City ® is a collection of buildings, 
rubble, and trains accurately replicating damage to major 
urban structures. The Summer Institute conducted high 
fidelity concept experimentation with subject matter 
experts (SMEs) from Texas Task Force 1 (TX-TF1), Texas 
National Guard’s 6th Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Civil Support Team (CST), and the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), which is the state 
environmental protection agency. Experimenters hid a 
Cesium-137 radiological source emitting at 10 times the 
background radiation in a collapsed three-story building 
to simulate a leak in a nuclear medicine ward in a major 
hospital after an earthquake. Two different rotorcraft—a 
single rotor 1.5 m helicopter and a micro quadrotor—
were used to fly missions at realistic standoff distances 
and conditions, providing a diversity of UAS platforms. 
An unmanned ground vehicle was used independently to 
locate the source (Duckworth, Shrewsbury, and Murphy, 
2013); however, that effort is beyond the scope of this 
article.
A goal of the concept experimentation was to identify 
the autonomous capabilities needed for a SUAS response 
to a radiological event. In particular, the experimentation 
addressed three questions:
What are the missions that SUASs will be expected 
to conduct? What are are the tasks that comprise 
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these missions and the strategies that SUASs can 
use to accomplish them? What is the sociotechnical 
organization of a radiological response and how does 
that impact the need for, and types of, autonomous 
capabilities?
This article uses the definition and categories of autonomy 
from the recent Defense Science Board study on the role 
of autonomy in Department of Defense systems (Murphy 
and Shields, 2012). Following the study, autonomy is 
viewed as a set of capabilities that enable the human-
machine system to accomplish a mission. Autonomous 
capabilities for unmanned systems will generally fall 
into one of three categories:  vehicle autonomy, such as 
hovering and healthmonitoring; navigational autonomy, 
such as obstacle avoidance and path planning; and 
mission autonomy, including situation awareness aids, 
data digestion, and visualization.
The article is organized as follows. The relatively 
small volume of related work in unmanned systems 
for radiological events, either actual deployments or 
simulations, is reviewed in Section 2. Background 
information necessary for the understanding of the 
remainder of the paper is presented in Section 3. Section 
4 describes the 2013 Summer Institute, which hosted 
the discovery experiment. This section describes the 
discovery experiment process and how it is designed 
to work with SMEs to identify new mission capabilities, 
the staging of the experiment at Disaster City R_, the 
propositions being explored, the robots used, and the 
flights for each of the two missions. Section 5 reports 
on the cognitive work analysis used to capture the 
missions and operational envelope for the robots that 
provide the ecology for autonomy, the tasks that could 
be conducted autonomously and the strategies for those 
tasks, and the sociotechnical organizational constraints 
on autonomy. Section 6 discusses the implications for 
autonomy in terms of the vehicle, navigational, and 




The use of SUASs for radiological events has served as 
motivation for papers exploring some aspect of UAS 
swarms, such as maintaining wireless connectivity 
(Goddemeier, Daniel, and Wietfeld, 2012) or tracking 
a moving radiological source (Ristic, Morelande, 
Gunatilaka, and Rutten, 2007). It appears that only 
one SUAS has been engaged in an actual response to 
such an event, namely the Fukushima nuclear accident. 
Two theoretical papers project tasks and human-robot 
interaction that will be confirmed by the Summer 
Institute. Together the prior work suggests three tasks: 
radiological survey, radiation source localization, and 
perimeter detection.
The only known use of a SUAS for an actual 
radiological event was at the 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
accident (Murphy, 2014). Two Honeywell T-Hawk 
unmanned aerial vehicles were used for approximately 
40 missions from April 10, 2011, to the end of July, 2011, 
in order to conduct radiological surveys, visual damage 
assessment for structural integrity monitoring, and 
debris removal forecasts. The longest flightwas about 1.6 
km oneway.While theUAV use is considered sensitive 
information and has not been published by the Tokyo 
Electric Company, some details have been released 
or were recorded by Murphy, who designed the team 
protocols. The T-Hawk is a ducted fan weighing 8 kg 
without fuel. It has a range of up to 10kmand a speed of 
20.5 m/s (40 knots) with an endurance of up to 50 min. 
The T-Hawk has a camera and forward-looking infrared 
(FLIR) payload but no radiological sensor. Instead, a 
small gamma dosimeter was attached and matched to the 
vehicle’s GPS location for given time stamps. The robot 
had vehicle and navigational autonomy capabilities, 
but it relied heavily on human-robot teaming. The 
Honeywell pilots turned the autonomy off so as to be 
sure that they were aware of all commands being given 
to the robot, and thus any deviations from commanded 
position would be due to the wind or radiologically 
induced degradation of the system. The primary tasks 
were visual and radiological surveys, where the T-Hawk 
flew over the four reactor buildings at a fixed altitude and 
at one point hovered within a plume of smoke expected 
to be laden with radioactive particles. The initial survey 
showed that the projected radiation was less in some 
areas than expected, so that the SUAS team was allowed 
to move the SUAS heliport closer to the reactor buildings.
The work on human swarm intelligence by Bashyal 
and Venayagamoorthy (Bashyal and Venayagamoorthy, 
2008) simulates a radiological event in MATLAB and 
has two attributes that relate to findings from the 
Summer Institute. It proposes human-machine teaming, 
or human-robot interaction, where the user guides 
the swarm to areas of interest, rather than relying on 
all aspects of a flight being autonomous, from path 
planning to navigation. It also explores a particle swarm 
optimization algorithm for radiation source localization, 
where the PSO creates a dense radiological map from 
which a human can then visually extract the location of 
highest radiation.
Clark and Fierro (2005) frame radiological detection 
as a perimeter detection task, not as a radiation source 
localization task, for a set of unmanned ground vehicles. 
As will be discussed later, the Summer Institute exercise 
saw the responders use one of the SUAVs for an initial 
perimeter detection followed by a survey within the 
perimeter within the same flight.
Typical applications of chemical plume or pollution 
monitoring have historically been seen as either a 
single robot, single task application, as in Russell, 
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Thiel, Devesa, andMackay-Sim (1995) and Ishida, 
Nakayama, Nakamoto, and Moriizumi (2005), or a 
swarm application, single task, as in Zarzhitsky, Spears, 
and Spears (2005). In contrast, this exercise considers the 
need for the robot to be used for multiple tasks, including 
initial reconnaissance, source detection, and source 
localization. A nuclear forensics scenario also assumes 
the need for quick assessment, rather than a loiter-and-
observe approach as in monitoring applications.
 
3. Summer Institute 
The 2013 Emergency Informatics Summer Institute, June 
4–7, 2013, was the fifth held by Texas A&M, though the 
concept originated with Murphy in Murphy (2004), 
Gage, Murphy, and Minten (2004), and Murphy, Burke, 
and Stover (2006), and it was held annually at different 
locations until 2009. The Summer Institute approach 
to bringing together practitioners, researchers, and 
industry in high-fidelity exercises to foster and document 
innovation was formalized byWoods inWoods and 
Hollnagel (2006). The research objective of the Summer 
Institute is to conduct discovery experimentation. 
Discovery experimentation is a phase in a concept 
experimentation campaign (Alberts and Hayes, 2002) to 
create a newmission capability that can be adopted by 
the end user. Discovery experimentation is conducted 
in the highest possible physical and operational 
fidelity with SMEs in order to establish the reliability 
of the technology and the human-machine system 
performance. The radiological experiment simulated 
the collapse of a hospital with a large nuclear medicine 
wing from an earthquake. The intent was to examine 
technologies that could (i) speed up the initial survey of 
the level of radiation in the area and (ii) locate the nuclear 
material (also known as nuclear forensics) while (iii) 
reducing human exposure to radiation. The discovery 
experimentation process and the manual process, which 
serve as the baseline, are described in more detail below.
 
3.1. Discovery Experimentation Process 
The Summer Institute discovery experimentation 
process is shown in Figure 1. The ultimate goal is to 
innovate new complete mission capabilities; this means 
not just verifying that a technology works but that the 
system fits the missions needed by the end users and 
their operational, ergonomic, and training constraints. 
The process has three phases: screening an innovation(s) 
to determine if it has sufficient technical maturity and 
fits the requirements of the desired missions, conducting 
the discovery experiment itself with sufficient physical 
and concept-of-operations fidelity to test propositions 
using data collected in the field, and analyzing the data 
to determine how the technology can be refined to meet 
a suitable mission as well as identify any hardware or 
software technology gaps, any systems gaps leading 
to barriers in the data-to-decision (D2D) process, or 
cognitive barriers using cognitive work analysis (CWA). 
The result of the analysis phase is a determination 
of whether some technologies are not suitable for 
radiological response and thus manufacturers should 
not invest in pursuing a nonexistent market; identifying 
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if a technology is sufficiently mature and capable that 
it could be immediately adopted with minor upgrades, 
use doctrines, and training for early adopters; detecting 
system performance barriers and generating new 
methods or metrics to better capture these in the field; 
and uncovering new research questions.
The discovery experimentation process for 2013 started 
in December 2012 when subject matter experts from 
the Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) 
identified a radiological response mission capability to 
be of interest. The SMEs provided a basic scenario and 
a list of technology requirements. Using that scenario 
and list, the Center for Emergency Informatics (CEI) and 
the General Dynamics EDGER _ industry consortium 
circulated calls for participation for unmanned systems, 
sensors, and D2D and situation awareness software.
The screening phase began in March of 2013, when the 
SMEs reviewed the candidate technologies and selected 
a subset based on how well the technologiesmatched the 
mission requirements (e.g., needed verification) or offered 
an interesting capability (e.g., needed exploration). The 
SMEs selected three SUASs, though only two could 
participate, as well as several ground vehicles, sensors, 
wireless repeaters, and software packages. Note that 
discovery experimentation is not an inclusive event 
because not all technologies are sufficiently mature to 
participate in a high-fidelity situation, the interest by the 
responders does not apply equally to all innovations, 
and because the data collection process must be tailored 
to the devices or packages. Of the three invited SUASs, 
two committed to participation, as participants were 
required to cover their own costs.
The experimental phase began at the same time as 
the requests for participation and invitations were being 
extended. The CEI team created a set of propositions 
to guide the construction of a data collection plan that 
would capture both the physical performance and the 
general cognitive system performance and bottlenecks. 
Technologies with data logging capabilities were 
integrated into the RESPOND-R test instrument whenever 
possible for centralized data collection. The RESPOND-R 
test instrument is a logging platform for robotic and 
cyber-physical systems used in emergency response 
(Shrewsbury,Henkel, Kim, and Murphy, 2013). It acquires 
sensor data from agents in the field and relays real-time 
information to listening parties for logging and analysis. 
RESPOND-R data management includes archival data 
propagation, classification, and visualizations. The 
RESPOND-R framework was developed on top of the 
Robot Operating System (ROS) and is currently integrated 
with the iRobot Packbot 510, AirRobot 100B, and the 
AEOS Marcy as well as stand-alone sensors, including 
the Davis Vantage Vue weather station, Canberra Radiac 
Geiger Counter, and RAE Systems PPBRAE.
The analysis step of the discovery experiment in Figure 
1 is ongoing; this article reflects the technological gaps 
and the CWA of the data collected with the SUAS with 
respect to autonomy.
 3.2. Manual Radiological Surveys and Forensics
Radiological surveys and forensics have traditionally 
been conducted by a team of six human specialists: two 
in Level A suits to enter the hot zone carrying radiological 
and gas sensors, as shown in Figure 2, two in Level A suits 
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in reserve to rescue the two down range if necessary, and 
two to assist with donning the gear and decontamination 
when they return. It takes on the order of 1 h to set up the 
decontamination system, don the gear, and enter the hot 
zone for the assessment. Typically, the responders do not 
report observations in real time, so it is on the order of 
45–60 min before they return with radiological readings 
and a verbal assessment of the situation. Furthermore, 
the density of sensor readings and the quality of the 
assessment may be hampered by the protective suits, as 
the plastic suits restrict mobility and visibility. As seen in 
Figure 2, the down range team literally has their hands 
full with sensors and cannot manage a camcorder, thus 
a SUAS with a suitable payload could provide real-time, 
dense sampling.
The concept of operations is that two suited responders 
would first approach a damaged building with a potential 
radiation hazard to make an initial assessment of the 
situation. If radiation is present, they would then follow 
up by localizing the radiological source. The initial 
assessment of the situation determines how far the scene 
extends, what buildings are involved, and whether there 
is any imminent danger, such as from radiation or gas 
leaks. The responders would prefer to have Google Earth 
or other satellite images of the incident to help plan the 
down range activities, but these images are at best days 
old and give no indication about the current scene, thus 
SUASs are an attractive option for obtaining actionable 
overhead imagery. If a radiological source was confirmed 
during the initial assessment, it would need to be located 
and mitigated in order for the rest of the response to move 
forward. Throughout all missions in a response, the most 
important rule is to be as accurate as possible because 
inaccurate information can cost time and resources, or 
worse, put lives at risk.
 
4. Experiments
The propositions for the 2013 Summer Institute were 
based on the gaps observed in the 2012 Summer Institute, 
which focused on a chemical train derailment (Duncan 
and Murphy, 2013), illustrating the feedback loop of 
“refine discovery experimentation” in Figure 1. The 
expectations for the use of SUASs for a radiological event 
were as follows:
·	 missions would be conducted faster with SUASs 
than manual inspection,
·	 vehicle and navigational autonomy would be 
challenging due to low altitude flights and prox-
imity to urban structures,
·	 the D2D process would experience bottlenecks, 
and as a result mission autonomy capabilities 
needed to overcome these bottlenecks would be 
identified.
The radiological discovery experiment had five steps. 
The familiarization step was held on June 4, 2013, where 
the SMEs had hands-on interaction with the technologies 
corresponding to basic awareness training; this basic level 
of training is consistent with how a new technology would 
be introduced ad hoc to the Public Safety community 
before more detailed and formal training occurred after 
purchasing the equipment. The second step, which 
occurred on the morning of June 6, was a table-top exercise 
style walk-through of a typical radiological response 
conducted by representatives of local, state, and federal 
agencies that would be responsible for responding to a 
radiological event to describe the response process, as it 
would likely be conducted by a group of researchers and 
industry representatives. The third step, which occurred 
on the afternoon of June 6, was to simulate the insertion 
of the technology into a response, where the technology 
teams had to report to the Incident Commander, be 
assigned to a responder team, were given a location 
and mission, and then were allowed to enter the warm 
zone, which is the area identified by the safety officers 
to be off limits to personnel not actively involved in the 
response. In addition, a trained human-machine system 
observer accompanied the responder team. The insertion 
maintained a high degree of operational fidelity, where the
SUASs were being used and directed by responders as if 
it were a real response with safety procedures, stand-off 
distances, radios, and communication protocols followed. 
The response continued until the mission objectives were 
met, though in prior Summer Institutes, some events ended 
without meeting the objectives when it became obvious 
that a technology could not accomplish the goal; unlike 
Advanced Technology Concept Demonstrations used 
by the military, which try to ensure that the technology 
succeeds and will retry or adapt to the scenario, discovery 
experimentation accepts mission failure as a valuable data 
point. The fourth preliminary feedback step concluded 
with a “hot wash” or preliminary after-action report 
immediately following the simulated response. The fifth 
step was a broader, facilitated after action review (AAR) 
conducted on the morning of June 7. The data collection 
team produced a preliminary synthesis of the results 
from data collection, and the SMEs worked on their 
observations overnight.
 
4.1. Staging of the Discovery Experiment
The experiment was staged around Building 133 at TEEX’s 
Disaster City R _ complex, which is in Class D airspace. 
The prop is a simulated building collapse capturing the 
key attributes of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, 
which was destroyed in the Oklahoma City Bombing. It 
is a three-story concrete building with rooms filled with 
office furniture, an attached parking garage collapsed 
onto cars, and a dense rubble pile on one side. The 
prop provides the same materials, construction style, 
and furnishings that multistory commercial buildings 
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would contain and that would absorb radiation. A “hot” 
radiological source, Cesium-137, emitting at 10 times the 
level of background radiation levels was placed in an 
interior room on the first floor (see Figure 3).
Two platforms were used, namely an AirRobot 100B 
owned and operated by the Center for Robot-Assisted 
Search and Rescue, and a Leptron Avenger owned and 
operated by Leptron.
·	 The AirRobot 100B (AirRobot, 2007), shown in 
Figure 4, is a quadrotor commonly used by the 
U.S. Army, and it is representative of the typi-
cal interfaces and data acquisition capabilities of 
small multi-rotor UASs. It has a single wire ring 
that protects the rotors from damage in a light 
collision. The AirRobot carried only a video or 
thermal imaging payload. TheAirRobot has au-
tonomous waypoint navigation and return-to-
position behaviors, but these were not used be-
cause the mission specialists wanted to see and 
direct in real time.AGammaPix radiation detec-
tor on a cell phone was considered as a payload, 
but the sensitivity of the sensor was too low to be 
of value and thus it was not used in this study. 
The Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Res-
cue has now developed a radiological payload 
for this vehicle which holds both a camera and 
a Personal Radiation Detector and will test this 
payload at theWinter Institute in November 
2013.
·	 The Leptron Avenger (Leptron, 2013), shown in 
Figure 4, is a single-rotor system based on a T-
REX frame commonly used by law enforcement, 
and it features the capabilities of a larger system 
with heavier payload capabilities. The Avenger 
had the ability to either be flown by the pilot’s 
hand controller or to plot flights via a ground 
control laptop to specify both a path and specific 
points of interest at a given altitude. It was modi-
fied to carry a Thermo Scientific RadEye PRD-
ER High-Sensitivity Personal Radiation Detector 
(Scientific, 2013) supplied by the CST and taped 
to its airframe upside down to get a better read-
ing. Due to the fact that the RadEye did not have 
a logging function, the onboard camera was used 
to monitor the readings, which required the pi-
lot to fly heads up and sacrificed any visual data 
about the incident when monitoring the sensor.
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The SMEs participating in the experiment were hazardous 
material specialists from TX-TF1 and the Texas National 
Guard’s CST, both of which would be expected to send 
personnel to directly approach, localize, and mitigate the 
radiological incident, and TCEQ, which would respond to 
and assist in mitigation and recovery from a radiological 
event.
 4.2. Missions
The team was assigned two missions by the incident 
commander: first an initial assessment followed by a 
request for radiological source localization. The SUASs 
were able to survey the incident and localize the source 
in two flights. Since there were two SUASs, each flew the 
same mission, for a total of four flights, though as will be 
discussed in Section 5, the difference in platforms led to 
different strategies. Table I summarizes the flights. All 
flights were conducted in line of sight and teleoperated. 
The SUASs did not fly through radioactive dust or 
materials, so the they did not have to be decontaminated. 
Since the team worked from the warm zone and did not 
handle a contaminated robot, they did not have to wear 
protective gear.
The UAV team was made up of three members 
following the concept of operations established in Pratt, 
Murphy, Stover, and Griffin (2009) and used for responses 
in Italy (Kruijff et al., 2012) and Cyprus (Angermann, 
Frassl, and Lichtenstern, 2012): a Pilot, a Safety Observer, 
and a Mission Specialist. The Pilot-in-Command of all 
flights was a licensed private pilot, as required by the FAA, 
but the primary Pilot for a given platform was determined 
by the amount of time accumulated flying that robot. The 
mission specialist, who was the responder in charge of 
the mission, directed the pilot and communicated with 
the Incident Command staff via a radio. On AirRobot 
flight one and Avenger flight two, two responders acted 
as mission specialists, though in a real deployment there 
most likely would have been oneMission Specialist to 
keep the team size as small as possible. The mission 
specialists rotated out with one from TCEQ, primary on 
Avenger flight two, and one from CST, primary on both 
AirRobot flights and Avenger flight one. The safety officer 
was a CRASAR SUAS specialist, either Tanner Perkins or 
Robin Murphy, trained for the position and concerned 
with airspace and responders or ground robots working 
beneath the SUAS, vehicle safety, and team safety. The 
Pilot was Brittany Duncan for the AirRobot and Scott 
Heath was the Avenger Pilot.
Data from the SUAS were collected and archived 
using the RESPOND-R test instrument. The data from 
each SUAS were robot-eye video recorded by the SUAS, 
flight data recorded by the SUAS, and time stamps of 
the data. In addition, the flight logs filled in by the SUAS 
team, observational logs of the SUAS team activities, and 
observational logs of the incident command activities 
were collected.
4.2.1. Mission 1: Initial Assessment
The SUAS team was tasked to leave the Base of Operations 
and enter the “warm zone, ”maintaining a standoff 
distance of 125 m (410 ft) from the source. Staging Area 1 
corresponded to the same standoff distance for a manual 
team. For a map of the warm and hot zones, refer to Figure 
5. Due to line-of-sight limitations on the SUAVs, the team 
chose to set up at the intersection of two roads just outside 
of the warm zone. The team was approximately 500 m 
from the Base of Operations without reliable wireless 
connectivity either through a local MANET or cellular 
service. The time from arriving at Staging Area 1 to the 
first SUAS in the air was 16 min.
The AirRobot flew the first flight, and completed a 
visual inspection of the building by flying to the middle 
of the incident and completing two 360 degree rotations 
while getting complete coverage with a 10 megapixel still 
camera, then flying around to get pictures of all sides of 
the building.
The Avenger flew the second flight and completed 
a visual inspection by flying around the exterior of the 
incident switching between FLIR and high-resolution 
video, then it conducted a radiological survey with the 
RadEye sensor to confirm the presence of a radiological 
source. The mission specialist directed the flight and 
reported higher radiological readings to incident 
command after landing.
After each flight, the mission specialist(s) prioritized 
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the still pictures and videos from the flights to be sent 
to incident command so that it could be triaged when it 
arrived. Data for the incident commander were sent via 
thumb drive by having a data manager walk or drive it 
to the command post. The thumb drive with the photos 
from flight 1 was available 14 min after landing and 
took an additional 8 min to transport to command, so it 
was delivered 22 min after landing. Video from flight 1 
was sent with the video and picture data from flight 2. 
This thumb drive was available 4 min after landing and 
arrived at command 5 min later, so it was delivered 9 
min after landing.
The outcomes of the first mission were as follows: 
1) the extent of the physical damage was captured 
visually, and 
2) the radiation was determined to be less than expected 
and thus the warm zone boundaries were decreased.
 
4.3. Mission 2: Radiation Source Localization
After completing Mission 1, the SUAS team was directed 
to conduct a radiation source localization mission, but 
were allowed to move closer to the incident and launch 
from Staging Area 2.
The Avenger flew the third flight while providing 
real-time data from the RadEye sensor in order to locate 
the source and confirm on what floor of the building it 
was located. The mission specialist guided the flight and 
used the secondary mission specialist to call the highest 
readings to incident command during the flight. After the 
flight, the highest reading was confirmed with incident 
command, along with its approximate location on the 
front of the building. The mission specialist essentially 
used a “greedy search” by following the increasing 
readings and avoiding the decreasing readings to direct 
the pilot to fly to the highest readings.
The AirRobot flew the fourth flight to simulate a 
radiological source localization with a closer proximity 
to the building and the ability to scan the front of the 
building in a more organized fashion due to the hoop 
protecting the blades. After this scan was complete, 
the AirRobot was tasked to complete a more thorough 
visual inspection to try to locate a picture of the source 
if possible.
Figure 5. A map showing the “warm zone” and “hot zone” distances in the Summer Institute Exercise in reference to the “hospital
collapse” (1), first staging area (2), second staging area (3), and Incident Command (4).
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The outcome of the second mission was a determination 
that the source was on the first floor, but no visual of the 
source was captured. As in Mission 1, still photos and 
videos were recorded to a thumb drive and delivered by 
the data manager to the incident commander. The data 
from flight 3 were available 24 min after the flight and 
took 9 min to walk to command, so they were delivered 
33 min after landing. Flight 4 sent the data 5min after 
landing, and they arrived 6 min later for a total of 11 min 
after landing.
5. Cognitive Work Analysis
A CWA (Vicente, 1999) was conducted on the data 
gathered by the discovery experiment in order to establish 
the preliminary domain theory and to determine if 
the propositions in Section 4 were supported. CWA 
is a tool for understanding a formative domain, one 
where an innovation has the potential to change or 
eliminate existing tasks. It was used to create SUAS crew 
organization and protocols from flights after Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 (Pratt et al., 2009); the resulting concept 
of operations was used at the 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
accident, the 2011 Cyprus explosion (Angermann 
et al., 2012), and the 2012 Finale Emilia earthquake 
(Kruijff et al., 2012). CWA consists of five components: 
a work domain analysis, which models what SUASs are 
expected to do and the conditions or constraints under 
which they operate, control task analysis and strategies 
analysis, which identify the specific, reoccurring tasks 
in the domain that must be done (control tasks) and 
how they are done (strategies), and social organization 
and cooperation analysis and worker competencies 
analysis, which capture the sociotechnical factors that 
can influence the acceptability of autonomy. Of these, the 
control task and strategies analyses are the most critical 
for identifying specific autonomous capabilities because 
they represent specific desirable capabilities that are 
candidates for autonomy.
 5.1. Work Domain
The discovery experiment suggests that the work 
domain will benefit from the introduction of SUASs 
overall as SUASs will reduce the number of responders 
and accelerate data gathering. The overall missions, 
work flow, and location of the team will remain the same 
and the general time associated with getting the initial 
set of information will be decreased by 53%, but though 
there will be imagery added to the data-to-decision 
process, the process itself will remain unchanged. The 
introduction of a SUAS raises the question of how it 
will be decontaminated or maintained between flights. 
Furthermore, the personnel protection equipment makes 
it impractical to manually extract a SD card from a 
SUAS or perform other complex manipulations such as 
changing batteries.
The missions, work flow, and location of personnel 
appear to be the same. Both a manual and a SUAS 
team would conduct the same two missions: initial 
assessment and radiation source localization. Note that 
the perimeter detection mission proposed in the research 
literature (Clark and Fierro, 2005) appears to be a task 
within the initial assessment mission, not a distinctly 
separate mission. There is a possibility that a SUAS could 
conduct both missions in one flight, though the results 
of the initial assessment may allow the team to move 
the helispot closer for a more conducive line of sight for 
performing the localization mission. Both types of teams 
would have access to the same types of information prior 
to the missions (e.g., Google Earth maps) and the same 
reporting requirements. The entry/collection point at 
the warm zone for both teams would be on the order of 
125–300 m from the presumed area of interest for a small 
incident, though for the Fukushima nuclear incident the 
helispot was within the hot zone and on the order of 
1–1.6 km from the reactor buildings.
ASUAS could reduce the number of responders 
needed for a mission from six to three and, under ideal 
conditions, reduce the number exposed to radiation from 
two to zero. A manual team requires six responders: two 
in Level A suits to enter the hot zone, two in Level A suits 
in reserve to rescue the two downrange if necessary, and 
two to assist with donning the gear and decontamination 
on return. A SUAS eliminates the need for the two 
downrange and the two in reserve, assuming that the 
SUAS does not need to be retrieved and decontaminated 
by a suited responder. As described in Section 4, a SUAS 
team consists of three members.
A SUAS can accelerate the acquisition of actionable 
data and possibly provide higher-quality data. The first 
flight of a SUAS during the experiment occurred 16 min 
after the team arrived at the helispot, with the mission 
specialist beginning to make radio observations to 
the Incident Commander at 50 min after arrival, 2 min 
after the second flight landed, to let command know 
that radiation levels were elevated over the southern 
part of the collapse. A manual team would take on the 
order of 1 h to set up the decontamination system, don 
the gear, and enter the hot zone (see Figure 2). Typically, 
the responders do not report observations in real time, 
so it is on the order of 45– 60 min before they return 
with radiological readings and a verbal assessment of 
the situation. However, the density of sensor readings 
and the quality of the assessment may be hampered by 
the protective suits, as the plastic suits restrict mobility 
and visibility. As seen in Figure 2, the downrange team 
literally has their hands full with sensors and cannot 
manage a camcorder. The recorded imagery from a SUAS 
may be of greater overall utility.
While a SUAS can in theory provide significant 
benefits to a radiological response, current SUASs may 
have to be redesigned in order to be adopted. The major 
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issue is decontamination of the SUAS. If the SUAS cannot 
be decontaminated, it can remain in the hot zone but will 
require a responder in personal protective equipment 
(PPE) to enter, recharge it, replace any recording media, 
etc. The responder must then be decontaminated, 
etc., increasing the manpower needs and logistics tail. 
The ergonomics of manipulating a SUAS in PPE may 
influence the system design. A secondary issue for SUAS 
adoption is possible susceptibility to radiation, however 
this was not seen at Fukushima.
 
5.2. Control Task and Strategies Analysis
The initial assessment is generally accomplished by 
getting as much information as possible from both a 
visual scan and a limited amount of sensor data, such as 
radiological and gas readings. If possible, these would 
be conducted at the same time, and data from all sensors 
would be recorded. As a side effect of the radiological 
survey, the perimeter detection task should be completed 
and may allow for a reduction in the hot zone and warm 
zone areas. After the mission, it would be preferable to 
be able to cue up a full playback of the mission, including 
the telemetry, video, and sensor data at any given point in 
the flight. Additionally, GPS tagging on all data (images, 
sensor readings) is necessary for them to be valuable to 
the overall operations at incident command.
5.2.1. Initial Assessment Mission
The initial assessment mission is characterized as 
generally providing comprehensive visual coverage 
from a low altitude, 22–40 m. The altitude appears to be a 
function of the desired view, where higher gives a wider 
view, and the height of the structures. However, these 
altitudes appear too high for a useful radiological survey 
and just indicate the presence of radiation. The two 
strategies were a formal strategy for ensuring coverage 
of the visual imagery and an ad hoc clockwise sweep.
The strategy used by the AirRobot for the mission 
(Air- Robot Flight 1) had two steps. First, the pilot 
flew the SUAS to what appeared to be the middle of 
the incident area and took 17 pictures in a 360 degree 
pattern (eight pictures each at 60 and 30 degree camera 
tilt angles and one looking straight down) in order to get 
overlapping images that provided full coverage of the 
rubble pile and the building. The collection of images 
would be suitable for tiling into a master image or for 
a reconstruction program such as photosynth. While 
an automated process for this exists on the AirRobot 
platform, it was not used at this time in order to allow 
the mission specialist to pause the process if a point of 
interest was identified. The pilot then continued around 
the building to get pictures of all four sides, similar to 
elevation views. The flight path is not shown.
The strategy used by the Avenger for the mission 
was for the pilot to fly a clockwise sweep around the 
area of interest; this was approximately the first 3 min 
of Avenger Flight 1. The flight path for the entire flight is 
shown in Figure 6.
5.2.2. Radiation Localization Mission
The radiation localization mission is characterized by 
extremely low altitude flights (0.3 m) in close proximity 
to structures (1.5 m) and terrain (1.5 m). The actual 
strategies used for the Avenger and AirRobot were 
different due to the differences in their design. The 
Avenger used a greedy search around the front face 
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of the building with a standoff distance of 3m, while 
the AirRobot used a horizontal raster scan from top to 
bottom with a standoff distance of 1.5 m. In the AirRobot 
flight, the mission specialist intervened to direct the 
robot to opportunistically gather information. While 
the mission specialist did not offer a strategy for the 
initial assessment mission, there appeared to be strong 
opinions on how to accomplish the radiation localization 
mission. For a multistory building, either a horizontal 
or vertical raster scan of each face of the structure (see 
Figure 7) is desired by the SMEs to provide repeatability 
and complete radiological coverage. However, the SME 
did not give quantitative sensing requirements, and it 
is possible that any strategy that provided a sufficient 
survey would be acceptable. Additionally, a request was 
made for either of the SUAS platforms to complete a 
scan over the rubble pile at 1.5 m to verify that there was 
not another source in the rubble. Due to the low altitude 
requested and the variability of the pile, both pilots and 
safety officers declined.
The Avenger conducted a radiation localization 
mission as the later portion of its Flight 1 and then as a 
dedicated Flight 2. For the later portion of Flight 1, the 
strategy was a raster scan at a constant altitude. The pilot 
directed the Avenger in a raster scan over the two-story 
building at a constant altitude of 16 m while avoiding the 
gantry (see Figure 8). The flight path for Avenger Flight 
1 shown in Figure 6 suggests that the raster scan was 
not uniform, but transitioned into a lower altitude scan 
(6 m) in front of the building after an initial high sensor 
reading.
The Avenger on Flight 2 used a greedy search, with 
the flight path shown in Figure 9. It was reconfigured to 
direct its video camera to the display for the radiological 
sensor, forcing the pilot to fly heads up but allowing the 
mission specialist to see the radiation readings in real 
time. The ability to fly heads up was possible because 
the team had moved to StagingArea 2 when the warm 
zone was reduced. As the Avenger flew in a horizontal 
scan from the top of the building to almost landing (0.3 
m minimum altitude), the mission specialist called out 
radiation readings and the pilot began to fly to maximize 
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the value. The Avenger attempted to stay around 3 m 
off the structure, balancing wind gusts, GPS shadows, 
and the possibility of a collision with the sensitivity of 
the sensors to radiation based on distance. The greedy 
search algorithm was hampered by the inability of either 
the pilot or the mission specialist to remember where the 
highest readings were taken. This increased the cognitive 
workload of the pilot and the mission specialist. The 
pilot had to attempt to associate readings with locations 
while flying, while the mission specialist had to look up 
to see the location of the robot, then back down to the 
sensor display.
The AirRobot conducted a simulated radiation 
localization mission on Flight 2, shown in Figure 10, as 
it did not have a radiological payload. For this flight, 
the AirRobot attempted a horizontal scan over the front 
of the building with instructions to get “as close as 
possible,” which translated in practice to a 1.5 m standoff 
distance. The AirRobot was able to operate closer to the 
structure because of the wire safety hoop. During the 
course of the flight, the mission specialist interrupted the 
raster scan to take pictures through the windows to see if 
any other visual information could be gained. After the 
conclusion of the pattern to the satisfaction of the SMEs, 
it was requested that the AirRobot fly close to the top of 
the building to see if it was possible to spot the source 
through the grates of the building’s ceiling, and finally to 
see if the source could be seen by looking in the doorway 
on the side of the building closest to the pilot.
 5.3. Social Organization and Cooperation Analysis and 
Workers Competencies
The social organization and cooperation analysis and 
the assessment of workers competencies provide insight 
into the expectations for autonomous capabilities and 
how autonomy might best complement the responders’ 
skills and interests. The control tasks and strategies 
analyses suggest a high degree of vehicle and navigation 
autonomy, while the user-oriented analysis (i) confirms 
the need for autonomy to complement the demanding 
flight regimes (e.g., vehicle and navigational autonomy) 
and (ii) suggests that autonomous data processing (e.g., 
mission autonomy) is a valuable capability.
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The social organization and cooperation analysis 
showed, not surprisingly, a hierarchical command and 
data to decision process, where the SUAS team provides 
their superior with relevant data. For both robots, the 
data digestion process consisted of copying imagery and 
geotagged stills to a USB drive. There was no indication 
that a USB drive with 2.2 GB of data was viewed, as the 
incident command staff would have had to sort through 
the files. Data digestion in the field by the SUAS team can 
be difficult. The radiation data were not georeferenced, 
and, as with Fukushima, would have had to be manually 
aligned with the GPS location of the platform for the 
time stamp of the radiation data. The SMEs wanted the 
radiation readings placed on an image of the incident 
as the most useful visualization. To provide this level of 
data digestion manually, the SUAS team would have to 
be expanded to add another member or one of the team 
members would need to acquire a new role.
The SMEs treated the missions as remote presence 
tasks, not taskable agent tasks (Murphy and Burke, 2008); 
they expected to direct the robot and essentially use it as 
an extension of themselves into the remote area of interest. 
This suggests that shared control between the pilot and 
mission specialist (“ok, you point it where you want to 
look”), with the robot providing guarded motion, may be 
of value. It is unlikely that for the foreseeable future the 
responders will have team members who can be diverted 
for training as a pilot, especially formissions that require 
low altitude, close proximity flights. This places greater 
demands on reliable autonomous capabilities to reduce 
the training load and to reduce any chance of failure, as 
the robot will likely crash.
 
6. Implications for Autonomy
 
The discovery experimentation provides both a 
preliminary domain theory for the use of a SUAS for 
radiological response and, by extension, for near earth, 
low altitude, close proximity flights in terms of vehicle, 
navigational, and mission autonomy.
 6.1. Domain Theory for Radiological Events
The discovery experiment indicates that a radiological 
event will place severe demands on guidance and 
control. To locate a radiation source, whose strength 
decreases as the square of the distance, SUASs will 
have to fly within 1.5 m of the ground surface (altitude) 
and structures (proximity). The terrains and structures 
may have been damaged in an earthquake or collapses, 
modified, or have cranes, scaffolding, vegetation, 
banners, power lines, or other unmodeled obstacles. The 
urban structures may interfere with GPS, as the AirRobot 
often dropped from 12 to 7 satellites and reported 
higher altitude than videotapes indicated it was flying. 
The experiment also provided insight into the types of 
obstacles, such as construction equipment and debris 
as well as trees and vegetation, and the terrain, such as 
irregular rubble varying 3 m in height. SUASs can reduce 
responder exposure, acquire data more quickly for initial 
assessment, and provide a more comprehensive and 
complete radiological survey. The types of flight paths 
needed are primarily for assessment and surveying 
the damage, which lend themselves to autonomy, but 
responders will need to opportunistically direct the robot 
to inspect conditions.
 6.2. Vehicle Autonomy
Vehicle autonomy will have to include low cost 
exteroceptive sensing such as optical flow or radar to 
provide position-hold flight control, rather than relying 
on GPS and barometric pressure. While most SUASs 
now have joy-stick neutral flight control, it is not clear 
how reliable an implementation will be when the robot 
is expected to be 1.5 m in altitude and 1.5 m from an 
urban structure. The loss of GPS position information 
is a strong possibility, with the SUAS operating within 
the error range of GPS and barometers, making them 
particularly susceptible to wind gusts near buildings.
 6.3. Navigational Autonomy
Navigational autonomy in SUASs have focused on 
waypoint navigation where the pilot enters GPS 
waypoints or taps locations on a map. The discovery 
experiment suggests that five other autonomous 
capabilities will be more valuable for a radiological 
response operating with 1.5 m of structures and at 
altitudes between 0.3 and 30 m: scan, obstacle avoidance, 
contour following, environment-aware return to home, 
and return to highest reading. Two of these, obstacle 
avoidance and environment-aware return to home, 
should be valuable for any near earth, low altitude 
application.
Scan. The two SUASs had waypoint navigation that 
was well suited for flying above the tree line or above 
structures, but waypoint navigation was not helpful for 
initial assessment, which is based around the team seeing 
the area of interest and then applying a scan algorithm to 
provide visual coverage, which could be autonomous. 
Scan algorithms are important to ensure full coverage and 
to limit the amount of interruption to a task that needs to 
be completed (e.g., tasking the pilot to look at structural 
issues when a radiological scan is needed). During 
this exercise, the control tasks and strategies analysis 
identified four scan algorithms: a 360◦ sweep from the 
epicenter of the area of interest, a horizontal (constant 
altitude) raster at 32 m above the incident, a horizontal 
raster along the face of a building, and a greedy search 
where the goal was to gain the highest radiation reading; 
this leads to a recommendation that SUASs be sold with 
multiple full-coverage algorithms to choose from based 
on the incident type and weather conditions.
Obstacle avoidance. The operational envelope for the 
14 Jo u r n a l o f fi e l d ro b o t i c s  (2014) 
SUAS will be from a 1.5 to 3 m horizontal distance, and 
it will need both the ability for guarded motion if being 
controlled manually, or full autonomy if completing a 
scan. This autonomy will enable faster and more accurate 
scans, but it will need to be resilient to holes in buildings 
or rubble and other unmodeled obstacles, such as those 
shown in Figure 8.
 Contour following. Contour following of complex 
rubble at an altitude of 1.5 m in order to detect radiation 
buried in a collapsed structure was repeatedly requested, 
but not performed due to the high risk of an accident. 
Contour following is distinct from scan, which has at least 
one plane (horizontal or vertical) that is free of obstacles. 
In addition to the irregularity of the terrain, the platform 
should also be able to update its own altitude even if it 
was launched from a point of higher elevation than the 
flight area, since pilots will often set their base station 
uphill from the intended flight path in order to maintain 
a better line-of-sight at lower altitudes.
 Environment-aware return to home. Both SUASs 
had return-to-home upon loss of signal capabilities, but 
these were not designed for cluttered environments. The 
Air- Robot procedure is to return to the highest altitude 
during the entire flight and then fly directly to home and 
autoland. However, if the robot were under the crane or 
an outcropping of a damaged building, it might collide.
 Return to the Highest Reading. Several SUASs 
now offer autonomous return to a preset location and 
viewpoint; this capability would autonomously analyze 
the incoming radiological readings during a scan and then 
return to the location where the highest reading occurred. 
This would eliminate the greedy search algorithm used 
in Avenger Flight 2, which did not produce a uniform 
radiological survey nor was it guaranteed to have the 
global maximum radiation reading.
 
6.4. Mission Autonomy
The most desired autonomous mission capability was 
not mission planning (e.g., what platform to use and 
what flight path to take), but rather decision-aiding 
by providing data digestion, or autonomous report 
generation. The SUAS itself should create logs showing 
the readings throughout the flight and match them 
with the robot’s telemetry data in order to enable the 
responders (or software agents) to better filter potential 
points of interest. Post-processing intelligence was 
needed to act on the digested data and identify the highest 
readings, and to generate geographically based synopses 
of key readings and imagery to help the decision makers 
better understand the information gathered.
 7. SUMMARY
Radiological response is representative of applications 
where small unmanned systems will be required to fly 
at low altitudes and in close proximity to structures. A 
discovery experiment was conducted with two SUASs, 
a single rotor Leptron Avenger, and an AirRobot 100B 
quadrotor, at a simulated building collapse atDisaster 
City R _ with a “hot” radiation source in order to 
ascertain autonomous capabilities that would facilitate 
adoption by responders. Acognitive work analysis of 
the data collected was conducted, and it was found that 
all three of the propositions motivating the experiment 
were correct:
·	  SUASs can conduct an initial assessment and a ra-
diological survey faster than a manual team; the data 
show that the SUAS started providing useful data in 
16 min and it reached command within 50 min after 
arrival, 10 min before the responders would have even 
been fully ready in Level A suits. In addition to being 
faster, SUASs can reduce or eliminate responder expo-
sure to radiation and reduce the number of respond-
ers needed to carry out missions from six to three.
·	 Vehicle and navigational autonomy will be chal-
lenging due to low altitudes and proximity to urban 
structures. Low altitudes (0.3–40 m) and close proxim-
ity to structures (1.5 m) are necessary to detect and 
localize a leaking radiation source such as might be 
found in a nuclear medicine ward. A rubble pile with 
a suspected radiation source may require contour fol-
lowing of 1.5 m. These extreme altitudes and proxim-
ity are because radiation strength decreases with the 
square of distance, so the SUAS must get as close as 
possible. In the experiment, the radiation source was 
on the first floor of a two-story commercial building, 
representing a worst case for a SUAS. While GPS was 
not lost, GPS coverage decreased by almost half, and 
if the pilot had not been actively engaged in supervi-
sion of the platform, a crash could have resulted. The 
experiment also indicated that unmodeled obstacles 
not appearing on a map or satellite image can pose 
major problems.
·	 The data-to-decision (D2D) process did experience 
bottlenecks that mission autonomous capabilities can 
overcome. The manual D2D process has a responder 
report any significant findings over the radio after 
the team returns with the data and then transports 
the complete dataset via a courier. A SUAS fits this 
process without creating bottlenecks. However, 
its ability to record video and still imagery along 
with the radiological readings offers a richer raw 
dataset. Though these data arrive at the same time, 
or earlier because of the faster start, they are not in a 
digested form that can be readily used by the incident 
commander, and they were not looked at. Perhaps 
the major lesson from the discovery experiment is 
that autonomous capabilities should be designed to 
augment, not replace, the human pilot and mission 
specialist capabilities in these harsh environments 
while protecting the vehicle from harm and to aid 
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rapid, accurate decision making. Five autonomous 
navigational capabilities were identified with 
immediate import: scan, obstacle avoidance, contour 
following, environment-aware return to home, and 
return to highest reading. Two of these, obstacle 
avoidance and environment-aware return to home, 
should be valuable for any near earth, low altitude 
application.
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